Strategic complements, substitutes, and Ambiguity: the implications for public goods. (Q1867536)
From MaRDI portal
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | Strategic complements, substitutes, and Ambiguity: the implications for public goods. |
scientific article |
Statements
Strategic complements, substitutes, and Ambiguity: the implications for public goods. (English)
0 references
2 April 2003
0 references
The paper is mainly concerned with comparative statics in symmetric \(n\)-players games having aggregate externalities. In this context, the authors examine how the ambiguity interacts with the properties of strategic substitutes and complements in games. Thus, one shows that in the games with strategic substitutes and positive externalities, increasing ambiguity has the effect of increasing the strategy played in symmetric equilibrium and in the class of games with at least three Nash equilibria the strategic complementarities are sufficiently strong to generate multiple equilibria. Some economic applications, the immediate implications for public goods further applications and significant conclusions are also considered in this research paper under appropriate references.
0 references
ambiguity
0 references
strategic complements
0 references
public goods
0 references
Choquet integral
0 references
free rider.
0 references