Clinching auctions with online supply (Q2206820)

The article is devoted to an important topic: clinching auctions with online supply. The authors study the following question: Can one design efficient incentive compatible mechanisms for the case when agents have budget constraints and the supply arrives online? More precisely, the authors show that for budget constraints it is possible to obtain incentive compatible and Pareto-optimal auctions that allocate and charge for items as they arrive, by showing that the adaptive clinching auction in the sense for multi-unit supply [\textit{S. Dobzinski} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 74, No. 2, 486--503 (2012; Zbl 1279.91080)] can be implemented in an online manner. It is shown that the adaptive clinching auction satisfies a supply-monotonicity property. Algorithmic and explicit form of the adaptive clinching auction are given in Section 5. Appropriate examples are given to illustrate the reliability of the proposed theoretical results.