Hilbert, logicism, and mathematical existence (Q1036075)

The article deals with David Hilbert's (1862--1943) early work on foundational questions, especially those corresponding to the 1890s. The author's main thesis states that the young Hilbert was a logicist closely related to Richard Dedekind's (1831--1916) understanding. Based on this view, he analyses the development of Hilbert's foundational ideas -- in particular about geometry, the real numbers, consistency proofs, and mathematical existence. His main claim is: ``the (contradictory) principle of comprehension, a central element of logic for the logicists, was the soil from which Hilbert's claim -- that the consistency of an axiom system entails the mathematical existence of its objects -- was to emerge.'' (p.\ 35) The first section substantiates by some quotes of the 1890s that Hilbert considered arithmetic to be only a part of logic -- with an explicit reference to Dedekind's `Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?' (1888) -- and geometry to be an essentially different domain: the theory of space. Moreover, Dedekind's contributions to logicism are analysed. The second section presents concepts of `existence' in mathematics before Hilbert and mostly refers to Dedekind who identifies it with logical admissibilty. The third section distinguishes Hilbert's early informal axiomatics -- in particular for the real numbers and geometry -- from his later strictly formal `Hilbertprogramm'; this early axiomatics is claimed to fall within the set-theoretic tradition. However, in contrast to Georg Cantor (1845--1918), Hilbert understood set theory without Cantor's strong Platonistic ontological commitments. Again, the connection to Dedekind is underlined, in particular Dedekind's concept of a chain is compared to Hilbert's completeness axiom. The fourth section is devoted to the set-theoretic antinomies (paradoxes, or contradictions) -- in particular Hilbert's paradox -- and the role of the principle of comprehension as well as Hilbert's and Cantor's reaction to it. The next two sections present Hilbert's concept of mathematical existence and its relation to consistency as well as his early attempts for consistency proofs. Here, the reader might look for a (technical) substantiation of the core thesis. The next section sketches Hilbert's switch to purely syntactical consistency proofs taking place between 1900 and 1904. The final section summarises the conclusions and arguments of the paper.