Social choice and bargaining perspectives on distributive justice (Q1311458)

This monograph studies the concept of distributive justice from two standpoints, mathematical and experimental. The monograph consists of 5 chapters, the first two by Gaertner, the last two by Klemisch-Ahlert, and the middle one by both. Chapter 1 surveys the concept of distributive justice from is origins in Aristotle, through Bentham, up to Rawls. Indeed, the entire book can be said to constitute a step beyond Rawls. Chapter 2 axiomatizes a general nonlinear social welfare function, which contains Rawls' maximin rule as a special case. This chapter also contains results from a questionnaire-based experiment, which is designed to capture some of the aspects of Rawls' original position. The results lend a modest amount of support to Rawls' theory. Chapter 3 surveys three bargaining solutions, two of which are well-known (Nash and Kalai \(\&\) Smorodinsky) and have utilitarian foundations, and one of which was new to me (Gauthier). The latter is a bargaining theory analogue of Rawls' maximin rule. Chapter 4 axiomatizes Gauthier's maximin rule on two classes of bargaining problems. This result is noteworthy, since it extends beyond the 2-player case to \(n\) players. The final chapter discusses the results of some bargaining experiments. The main result here is that strong Pareto optimality is often sacrificed by subjects in favor or more equal payoffs -- a result with a distinct Rawlsian flavor. (It should be noted that the author has pursued these experiments to a much greater extent in other publications.) All told, the authors have brought to the concept of distributive justice an interesting combination of philosophical discussion, mathematical analysis, and behavior experiments. Philosophy is an activity, and this is a fruitful way to perform that activity.