Hypergames and Bayesian games: a theoretical comparison of the models of games with incomplete information (Q2439876)
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English | Hypergames and Bayesian games: a theoretical comparison of the models of games with incomplete information |
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Hypergames and Bayesian games: a theoretical comparison of the models of games with incomplete information (English)
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18 March 2014
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The article recalls the framework of hypergames, wherein each agent plays her own perceived game, along with the associated notions of hyper-Nash and best response equilibria. The main result is that these games can be represented as Bayesian games and the above equilibrium concepts then correspond to Bayesian Nash equilibria with subjective, respectively objective priors. Some methodological issues are discussed.
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hypergames
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Bayesian games
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hyper-Nash equilibrium
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best response equilibrium
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Bayesian Nash equilibrium
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