Customers' Optimal Joining Rules for the GI/M/s Queue
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Publication:5649794
DOI10.1287/mnsc.18.7.434zbMath0239.60093MaRDI QIDQ5649794
Publication date: 1972
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.18.7.434
60K25: Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory)
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