Evolutionarily stable sets in symmetric extensive two-person games (Q1183728)

The author shows that for the normal form of games involving informational asymmetries or repeated play, the standard approach of determining evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) often fails to predict the evolutionary outcome. This leads to the consideration of games in extensive form, where the roles of the players are determined by an initial random move. Using \textit{R. Selten}'s concept of a direct ESS [see Math. Soc. Sci. 5, 269-363 (1983; Zbl 0534.90095) and ibid. 16, No. 3, 223-266 (1988; Zbl 0666.90095)], defined in terms of behaviour strategies, the author characterizes evolutionarily stable (ES) sets for evolutionary games in extensive form. The dynamic stability of ES sets is proved in both the pure strategy and mixed strategy models. The theory is illustrated by three examples of biological games in extensive form (owner-intruder, hawk-dove with varying resource, male desertion game).