The modal logic of `all and only' (Q1097872)

A statement \(\square A\) expresses all-necessity if \(\square A\) is true in a world x iff A is true in all worlds y such that xRy. \(\square A\) expresses only-necessity, however, if \(\square A\) is true in x iff A is true only in worlds y such that xRy, i.e. for all worlds y, if A is true in y, then xRy. The weakest system of all-necessity is K; the weakest system of only-necessity is anti-K (in which the K rule: if \(\vdash A_ 1\&...\&A_ n\supset B\), then \(\vdash \square A_ 1\&...\&\square A_ n\supset \square B\), is replaced by: if \(\vdash A\supset B_ 1\vee...\vee B_ n\), then \(\vdash \square B_ 1\&...\&\square B_ n\supset \square A)\). What then is the weakest system for all-\&-only necessity, whereby \(\square A\) is true in x iff A is true in all and only worlds y such that xRy, i.e. A is true in y if and only if xRy ? That system is defined here, and shown to be sound and complete. The axioms and rules, however, prove to be much more complicated than one might at first expect.