On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly (Q1779013)

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On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly
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    title
    On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly (English)
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    publication date
    20 June 2005
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    zbMATH DE Number
    2177221
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    zbMATH Keywords
    Plurality rule
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    regular equilibria
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    stable sets.
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    OpenAlex ID
    W3125111876
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