On the consistency of the first-order portion of Frege's logical system (Q1098830)

The first-order part of Frege's logical system contains, in addition to the usual ingredients of predicate logic, a course-of-value (Wertverlaufs-) operator `\(\acute{\;}\)' which is characterized by the axiom (``Frege's abstraction principle''): \((x)(Ax\equiv Bx)\equiv \acute xA=\acute xB\) (for any open formulae A, B). The full Fregean system is obtained by admitting quantification over functions; this enables us to define membership as: \(x\epsilon y:=(\exists f)(fx\&y=\acute xfz).\) It is known that then the abstraction principle of naive set theory becomes provable which leads to inconsistencies (Russell's paradox). The present paper shows that the first-order part is consistent: it is possible to extend a usual first-order interpretation to the set of course-of-value names such that all instances of the Fregean abstraction principle are satisfied.