How to eliminate self-reference: a précis (Q2460179)

This paper presents a method for eliminating self-reference from a simple language in which the familiar semantic paradoxes can be expressed. Given such a non-quantificational language, \(L\), containing a truth predicate and names for sentences, for each sentence \(F\) of \(L\) there is associated an infinite series of translations, \(h_0(F),h_1(F),\dots\), in a quantificational language, \(L^*\), such that none of the translations is self-referential but any one of them mimics the semantic behavior of the original. This extends the work of \textit{S. Yablo} [Analysis, Oxf. 53, No. 4, 251--252 (1993; Zbl 0943.03565)] and \textit{R. T. Cook} [J. Symb. Log. 69, No. 3, 767--774 (2004; Zbl 1070.03003)]. As with that work, the aim is to show that self-reference and circularity is not essential to any of the peculiar semantic phenomena of that simple language. The present results are limited to languages \(L\) that are non-quantificational and contain only a single sentence-denoting predicate. This work assumes \textit{S. Kripke}'s theory of truth [J. Philos. 72, 690--716 (1975; Zbl 0952.03513)] throughout.