Stochastic Stability in Schelling’s Segregation Model with Markovian Asynchronous Update

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-99813-8_38zbMath1518.91177arXiv1807.05419OpenAlexW2884556041MaRDI QIDQ6163610

Gabriel I. Istrate

Publication date: 30 June 2023

Published in: Developments in Language Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.05419

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic models in economics (91B70) Stochastic stability in control theory (93E15) Dynamical aspects of cellular automata (37B15)

Cites Work

• Probing robustness of cellular automata through variations of asynchronous updating
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
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• Potential games
• The logit-response dynamics
• Logit Dynamics with Concurrent Updates for Local Interaction Games
• A Guided Tour of Asynchronous Cellular Automata
• Adversarial scheduling in discrete models of social dynamics
• Dynamic models of segregation†
• Convergence of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game
• Adversarial Scheduling Analysis of Game-Theoretic Models of Norm Diffusion
• Convergence to Equilibrium in Local Interaction Games
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• An analysis of one-dimensional schelling segregation
• Perturbing the Topology of the Game of Life Increases Its Robustness to Asynchrony
• The dynamics of Schelling-type segregation models and a nonlinear graph Laplacian variational problem

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