TWO ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE GENERIC MULTIVERSE

DOI10.1017/s1755020319000327OpenAlexW3107797617MaRDI QIDQ6193398

Toby Meadows

Publication date: 16 March 2024

Published in: The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020319000327

zbMATH Keywords

forcingset theoryphilosophy of mathematicsphilosophy of set theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Other aspects of forcing and Boolean-valued models (03E40)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• THE SET-THEORETIC MULTIVERSE
• Number theory and elementary arithmetic†
• The downward directed grounds hypothesis and very large cardinals
• Set Theory
• IN SEARCH OF ULTIMATE-LTHE 19TH MIDRASHA MATHEMATICAE LECTURES
• The ground axiom
• THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CONTINUUM HYPOTHESIS
• The theory of Boolean ultrapowers
• Defending the Axioms

This page was built for publication: TWO ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE GENERIC MULTIVERSE