The set-theoretic multiverse

DOI10.1017/S1755020311000359MaRDI QIDQ2919945zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Joel David Hamkins

Publication date 23 October 2012

Published in The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223

zbMATH Keywords

multiverseforcingcontinuum hypothesisaxiom of constructibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Set theory (03E99)

Abstract: The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for.

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Cited in

(56)

• Arithmetic is determinate
• Set-theoretic foundations
• VARIETIES OF CLASS-THEORETIC POTENTIALISM
• Maximal ideals in countable rings, constructively
• BI-INTERPRETATION IN WEAK SET THEORIES
• Infinite populations, choice and determinacy
• The scope of Feferman's semi-intuitionistic set theories and his second conjecture
• The set-theoretic multiverse as a mathematical plenitudinous Platonism viewpoint
• Infinite forcing and the generic multiverse
• Intellectual humility in mathematics
• INDEPENDENCE PROOFS IN NON-CLASSICAL SET THEORIES
• Feferman on set theory: infinity up on trial
• Tools, objects, and chimeras: Connes on the role of hyperreals in mathematics
• Universism and extensions of \(V\)
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• THE COPERNICAN MULTIVERSE OF SETS
• Multiverse set theory and absolutely undecidable propositions
• On the set-generic multiverse
• Evidence for Set-Theoretic Truth and the Hyperuniverse Programme
• STEEL’S PROGRAMME: EVIDENTIAL FRAMEWORK, THE CORE AND ULTIMATE-L
• On the absoluteness of \(\aleph_1\)-freeness
• The hyperuniverse program
• Forcing revisited
• A classical way forward for the regularity and normalization problems
• RAMSIFICATION AND SEMANTIC INDETERMINACY
• A reconstruction of Steel's multiverse project
• Multiverse conceptions in set theory
• A MULTIVERSE PERSPECTIVE ON THE AXIOM OF CONSTRUCTIBILITY
• Mathematical modality: an investigation in higher-order logic
• Interview With a Set Theorist
• Maddy On The Multiverse
• The continuum hypothesis, the generic-multiverse of sets, and the \(\Omega\) conjecture
• Some Second Order Set Theory
• TWO ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE GENERIC MULTIVERSE
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• Set Theory and Structures
• Can we resolve the continuum hypothesis?
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• Forcing, Multiverse and Realism
• Indeterminateness and ``the universe of sets: multiversism, potentialism, and pluralism
• Naive infinitism: the case for an inconsistency approach to infinite collections
• The significance of relativistic computation for the philosophy of mathematics
• Conventionalism about mathematics and logic
• The set-theoretic multiverse: a natural context for set theory
• Of marriage and mathematics: inferentialism and social ontology
• Isomorphism invariance and overgeneration
• Infinitesimal analysis without the axiom of choice
• Category Theory and Philosophy
• Exploring mathematical objects from custom-tailored mathematical universes
• Structural relativity and informal rigour
• Multiverse conceptions in set theory
• THE MODAL LOGIC OF SET-THEORETIC POTENTIALISM AND THE POTENTIALIST MAXIMALITY PRINCIPLES
• Forcing and the universe of sets: must we lose insight?
• Is the dream solution of the continuum hypothesis attainable?
• What can a categoricity theorem tell us?
• Hierarchical multiverse of sets

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