The set-theoretic multiverse (Q2919945)

This paper argues for a new view of set theory, based on the concept of multiverse. The traditional view assumes a fixed concept of set and works within the universe of all sets. The author proposes that ``there are diverse distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe, which exhibits diverse set-theoretic truths''. The resulting study is an array of new fantastic, and sometimes bewildering, concepts and results that already have yielded a flowering of what amounts to a new branch of set theory. This ground-breaking paper gives us a glimpse of the amazingly fecund developments spearheaded by the author and, among others, by G. Fuchs, J. Reitz, V. Gitman, D. Linetsky, B. Löwe, W. H. Woodin, D. Seabold, R. Laver, R. M. Solovay, J. R. Steel, S.-D. Friedman, P. Welch, S. Stavi, and J. Väänänen. Readers should be familiar with forcing techniques, which are fundamental throughout. Two case studies of the multiverse view are given for the continuum hypothesis and the axiom of constructibility. Then the author formulates several basic principles that illustrate the multiverse perspective. (For example, the Realizability Principle: For any universe \(V\), if \(W\) is a model of set theory and definable or interpreted in \(V\), then \(W\) is a universe. Another example: Every universe \(V\) is a countable transitive model in another universe \(W\) satisfying \(V = L\).) There is also a seven-page appendix: ``Multiverse-inspired mathematics'', dealing with two topics, what the author calls the modal logic of forcing and set-theoretic geology.