Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection (Q2283133)
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English | Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection |
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Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection (English)
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30 December 2019
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The paper focuses on health insurance markets and consider a scheme of transfers among a regulator and insurers. In particular, the scheme proposed by the author is constructed considering that the regulator's transfers are based on the \textit{ex post} profits of insurers; moreover the regulator holds minimal information to implement the scheme. After explaining the model, the author delves into transfers, game and equilibrium; then a scheme of optimal transfers is provided as well as the existence and efficiency of equilibrium. A discussion about the results concludes the paper.
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efficiency
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health insurance
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risk selection
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risk adjustment
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