Equilibrium as compatibility of plans (Q2202239)

The paper of \textit{M. Hudik} [Theory Decis. 89, No. 3, 349--368 (2020; Zbl 07249049)] uses a game-theoretic framework to formalize the Hayekian notion of equilibrium as the compatibility of plans. In the sequel, the paper imposes more structure on the conventional model of strategic games. For each player, it introduces goals, goal-oriented strategies, and the goals' probabilities of success, from which players' payoffs are derived. The differences between the compatibility of plans and Nash equilibrium are identified and discussed. Moreover, the author shows that the notion of compatibility of plans, in general, differs from the notion of Pareto efficiency. Since the compatibility of plans across all players can rarely be achieved in reality, a measurement is introduced to determine various degrees of plan compatibility. Finally, several possible extensions and applications of the model are discussed. The paper's contents is widely innovative and pioneering. Many ideas are quite smart. Further, the author gives a quite good literature review. The paper is organized in an attentive way. Purpose of the paper is given perfectly. All theoretical results and examples are explained evidently. Finally, the paper is very well motivated, structured, written; theory, methods and applications vary in an appropriate way. I fully recommend the paper for researchers and graduate students in the area.