Pages that link to "Item:Q1159118"

The following pages link to Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy (Q1159118):

Displaying 21 items.

• Estimating the winning chances of a solution suggested by the first player under conditions of voting by veto (Q357921) (← links)
• A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting (Q656886) (← links)
• Implementability via protective equilibria (Q800203) (← links)
• Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs (Q952695) (← links)
• General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria (Q1068674) (← links)
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory (Q1162428) (← links)
• Sequential voting by veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin algorithm more versatile (Q1207320) (← links)
• Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function (Q1277454) (← links)
• Protective and prudent behaviour in games (Q1381967) (← links)
• A lemma in open sequential voting by veto (Q1680112) (← links)
• Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers (Q1680148) (← links)
• Properties of open procedure of sequential veto-voting (Q1735210) (← links)
• Protective behavior in matching models (Q1804637) (← links)
• Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results (Q1837610) (← links)
• The stability set as a social choice correspondence. (Q1867836) (← links)
• Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting (Q2021546) (← links)
• A solution to the two-person implementation problem (Q2025052) (← links)
• Dissolving a partnership securely (Q2175968) (← links)
• Controlling the order of moves in voting by veto. II. Algorithms for constructing an optimal order of moves (Q2263434) (← links)
• Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion (Q5934225) (← links)
• On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators (Q6053649) (← links)