Pages that link to "Item:Q1162423"

The following pages link to Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems (Q1162423):

Displayed 50 items.

• Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information (Q323245) ‎ (← links)
• Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance (Q337821) ‎ (← links)
• Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms (Q378333) ‎ (← links)
• Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining (Q405548) ‎ (← links)
• Communication in Cournot oligopoly (Q406389) ‎ (← links)
• Mediated contracts and mechanism design (Q417635) ‎ (← links)
• A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games (Q423716) ‎ (← links)
• Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions (Q449180) ‎ (← links)
• Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters (Q485801) ‎ (← links)
• Group stability in matching with interdependent values (Q490943) ‎ (← links)
• Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium (Q514479) ‎ (← links)
• How to talk to multiple audiences (Q536082) ‎ (← links)
• Supplier credits, limited liquidity, and timely demand information (Q538480) ‎ (← links)
• Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments (Q617587) ‎ (← links)
• Bidder collusion at first-price auctions (Q645060) ‎ (← links)
• Investment incentives in bilateral trading (Q645662) ‎ (← links)
• The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case (Q665107) ‎ (← links)
• Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring (Q705871) ‎ (← links)
• Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate (Q726619) ‎ (← links)
• Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all? (Q776858) ‎ (← links)
• Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies (Q825168) ‎ (← links)
• On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard (Q844941) ‎ (← links)
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values (Q848607) ‎ (← links)
• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case (Q852326) ‎ (← links)
• Hard evidence and mechanism design (Q864889) ‎ (← links)
• Communication and bargaining in the spatial model (Q869241) ‎ (← links)
• Revelation in informational dynamic settings (Q922251) ‎ (← links)
• Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm (Q951495) ‎ (← links)
• On the use of menus in sequential common agency (Q952782) ‎ (← links)
• State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics (Q959660) ‎ (← links)
• Long persuasion games (Q960240) ‎ (← links)
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition (Q1001814) ‎ (← links)
• Mathematical models of formation of rational organizational hierarchies (Q1003040) ‎ (← links)
• Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz (Q1022385) ‎ (← links)
• Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring (Q1036596) ‎ (← links)
• Optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints (Q1062888) ‎ (← links)
• Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information (Q1075257) ‎ (← links)
• Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria (Q1090264) ‎ (← links)
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model (Q1092773) ‎ (← links)
• Search mechanisms (Q1098748) ‎ (← links)
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions (Q1121185) ‎ (← links)
• Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans (Q1121812) ‎ (← links)
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms (Q1125569) ‎ (← links)
• Efficient allocation with continuous quantities (Q1174591) ‎ (← links)
• Managerial reporting discretion and the truthfulness of disclosures (Q1206348) ‎ (← links)
• Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation (Q1272653) ‎ (← links)
• Efficiency in correlated equilibrium (Q1278571) ‎ (← links)
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core (Q1294008) ‎ (← links)
• Existence of optimal auctions in general environments (Q1300508) ‎ (← links)
• Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information (Q1312878) ‎ (← links)