Pages that link to "Item:Q1164528"

The following pages link to Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence (Q1164528):

Displaying 50 items.

• Order of limits in reputations (Q333475) (← links)
• A dynamic game of reputation and economic performances in nondemocratic regimes (Q385167) (← links)
• Limited records and reputation bubbles (Q402059) (← links)
• Optimal policy with credibility concerns (Q405540) (← links)
• Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land (Q456424) (← links)
• Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games (Q523503) (← links)
• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers (Q533083) (← links)
• Quality distortions in vertical relations (Q547317) (← links)
• Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment (Q632959) (← links)
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts (Q645669) (← links)
• Impermanent types and permanent reputations (Q665455) (← links)
• Continuous time vs. backward induction (Q672679) (← links)
• Informal communication (Q707291) (← links)
• Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis (Q757220) (← links)
• Public trust and government betrayal (Q854929) (← links)
• When is reputation bad? (Q932806) (← links)
• Reputation and exogenous private learning (Q1017801) (← links)
• For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment (Q1018033) (← links)
• Investment timing and predatory behavior in a duopoly with endogenous exit (Q1027409) (← links)
• A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games (Q1072945) (← links)
• The chain-store paradox revisited (Q1084033) (← links)
• Strategic voting in repeated referenda (Q1097821) (← links)
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (Q1164553) (← links)
• Reputation and imperfect information (Q1164554) (← links)
• A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities (Q1192631) (← links)
• When are nonanonymous players negligible? (Q1268593) (← links)
• Resource allocation to defensive marketing and manufacturing strategies (Q1278332) (← links)
• To fight or not to fight? That is the question (Q1278554) (← links)
• A payoff uncertainty explanation of results in experimental centipede games (Q1279621) (← links)
• Bargaining with imperfect commitment (Q1304008) (← links)
• A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction (Q1367854) (← links)
• Reputation with noisy precommitment (Q1381963) (← links)
• Collusion under financial constraints: Collusion or predation when the discount factor is near one? (Q1391388) (← links)
• Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining. (Q1408706) (← links)
• Bargaining on behalf of a constituency (Q1581189) (← links)
• Asymmetric voluntary cooperation: a repeated sequential best-shot experiment (Q1621731) (← links)
• The signaling effect of raising inflation (Q1622462) (← links)
• Judicial torture as a screening device (Q1675013) (← links)
• Building reputation in a war of attrition game: hawkish or dovish stance? (Q1675040) (← links)
• Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust (Q1691367) (← links)
• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket (Q1810690) (← links)
• Reputation with observed actions (Q1814938) (← links)
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information (Q1818297) (← links)
• Perfect sequential equilibrium (Q1821707) (← links)
• Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information (Q1821709) (← links)
• Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty (Q1904630) (← links)
• Effective choice in the single-shot prisoner's dilemma tournament (Q1923338) (← links)
• Why should reform wait until things get really bad? (Q1927316) (← links)
• The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria (Q1934111) (← links)
• Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria (Q1934164) (← links)