Pages that link to "Item:Q1169928"

The following pages link to Limited liability contracts between principal and agent (Q1169928):

Displaying 43 items.

• Subjective evaluation versus public information (Q272293) (← links)
• Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection (Q375021) (← links)
• Sabotage in teams (Q433196) (← links)
• Supplier credits, limited liquidity, and timely demand information (Q538480) (← links)
• Supply chain coordination and setup cost reduction in case of asymmetric information (Q626641) (← links)
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices (Q753644) (← links)
• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (Q794886) (← links)
• Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge (Q795703) (← links)
• Moral hazard with bounded payments (Q960243) (← links)
• Ability-heterogeneity, entrepreneurship, and economic growth (Q975927) (← links)
• Optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints (Q1062888) (← links)
• Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankcruptcy constraints (Q1097823) (← links)
• Optimal contracts with public ex post information (Q1099054) (← links)
• What is a liquidity crisis? (Q1106068) (← links)
• Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems (Q1328149) (← links)
• Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt (Q1342676) (← links)
• Incentive contracting with hidden choices of effort and risk (Q1352163) (← links)
• Debt, moral hazard and airline safety: An empirical evidence (Q1362490) (← links)
• Incentive roles and fringe benefits in compensation contracts (Q1367890) (← links)
• The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration (Q1390201) (← links)
• Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty (Q1391618) (← links)
• A theoretical foundation of the Porter hypothesis. (Q1605265) (← links)
• Strategic sharing in regulatory regimes. (Q1605267) (← links)
• State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing (Q1642789) (← links)
• What determines volunteer work? On the effects of adverse selection and intrinsic motivation (Q1668270) (← links)
• Optimal allocation of MRI scan capacity among competing hospital departments (Q1926683) (← links)
• Selling less information for more: garbling with benefits (Q1927478) (← links)
• Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions (Q1996108) (← links)
• The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model (Q2046544) (← links)
• Money burning in subjective evaluation and limited liability: a case for pay for performance (Q2328554) (← links)
• Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard (Q2434231) (← links)
• Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems (Q2437832) (← links)
• On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment (Q2462897) (← links)
• Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints (Q2469872) (← links)
• Efficient contract enforcement (Q2636853) (← links)
• GRANTING AN EXIT OPTION TO CONDUCT AN AUDIT (Q3096865) (← links)
• Threshold incentives over multiple periods and the sales hockey stick phenomenon (Q3588805) (← links)
• PENALTIES WITHIN THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM (Q4282825) (← links)
• Partnership’s Profit Sharing: Linear and Nonlinear Contracts (Q4968307) (← links)
• Design of Incentive Programs for Optimal Medication Adherence in the Presence of Observable Consumption (Q5095170) (← links)
• Upfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiability (Q5245416) (← links)
• WAGE FLOORS, IMPERFECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES, AND OPTIMAL JOB DESIGN (Q5420151) (← links)
• What can we learn from simulating a standard agency model? (Q5958676) (← links)