Pages that link to "Item:Q1342681"
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The following pages link to Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments (Q1342681):
Displayed 13 items.
- The \(n\)-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations (Q540600) (← links)
- Existence, uniqueness and some comparative statics for ratio and Lindahl equilibria (Q1018029) (← links)
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets (Q1268574) (← links)
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement (Q1283855) (← links)
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets? (Q1294009) (← links)
- The Lindahl solution with changing population and recsources (Q1296481) (← links)
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets (Q1381985) (← links)
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation (Q1792571) (← links)
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments (Q1867834) (← links)
- The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic (Q2366923) (← links)
- Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods (Q2406941) (← links)
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839) (← links)
- Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments (Q5111104) (← links)