Pages that link to "Item:Q1420524"

The following pages link to Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. (Q1420524):

Displaying 22 items.

• On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets (Q404743) (← links)
• A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' (Q462856) (← links)
• Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences (Q477355) (← links)
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching (Q523005) (← links)
• The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings (Q523460) (← links)
• Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market (Q532688) (← links)
• The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences (Q637586) (← links)
• A further note on the college admission game (Q662278) (← links)
• Decentralized college admissions under single application (Q826044) (← links)
• On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory (Q908176) (← links)
• Finding all stable matchings with couples (Q908185) (← links)
• Constitutions and groups (Q1691356) (← links)
• Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability (Q2013343) (← links)
• Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets (Q2021788) (← links)
• Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab (Q2067353) (← links)
• Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem (Q2221249) (← links)
• Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration (Q2482665) (← links)
• Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter (Q2867466) (← links)
• Monge Properties, Optimal Greedy Policies, and Policy Improvement for the Dynamic Stochastic Transportation Problem (Q4995102) (← links)
• Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
• Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core (Q6063093) (← links)
• Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (Q6107369) (← links)