Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem (Q2221249)

Summary: The stable fixtures problem [\textit{R. W. Irving} and \textit{S. Scott}, Discrete Appl. Math. 155, No. 16, 2118--2129 (2007; Zbl 1155.91437)] is a generalized matching model that nests the well-known stable roommates, stable marriage, and college admissions problems as special cases. This paper extends a result of the stable roommates problem to demonstrate that a class of homophilic preferences with an appealing psychological interpretation is sufficient to ensure that starting from an arbitrary matching, a decentralized process of allowing the sequential matching of randomly chosen blocking pairs will converge to a pairwise-stable matching with probability one. Strategic implications of this class of preferences are examined and further possible generalizations and directions for future research are discussed.