Pages that link to "Item:Q1729671"
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The following pages link to Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable (Q1729671):
Displaying 8 items.
- Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences (Q2092786) (← links)
- When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? (Q2291174) (← links)
- Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results (Q2675456) (← links)
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation (Q6090447) (← links)
- Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment (Q6163283) (← links)
- The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization (Q6541989) (← links)
- Fairness and efficiency of the random serial dictatorship on preference domains with a tier structure (Q6556194) (← links)
- On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking (Q6564052) (← links)
