Pages that link to "Item:Q1762845"
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The following pages link to Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners (Q1762845):
Displaying 12 items.
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem (Q306741) (← links)
- Let them cheat! (Q423773) (← links)
- Balancing the power to appoint officers (Q523016) (← links)
- On the rule of \(k\) names (Q993784) (← links)
- Iterative voting and acyclic games (Q1677436) (← links)
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting (Q2019338) (← links)
- Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting (Q2171865) (← links)
- Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee (Q2247939) (← links)
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules (Q2334861) (← links)
- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences (Q2516133) (← links)
- The Basic Approval Voting Game (Q2829681) (← links)
- When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality (Q6173748) (← links)
