Pages that link to "Item:Q1772667"
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The following pages link to Stable matchings and preferences of couples (Q1772667):
Displayed 22 items.
- Matching with aggregate externalities (Q277295) (← links)
- Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm (Q314433) (← links)
- Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search (Q456691) (← links)
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching (Q523005) (← links)
- The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples (Q533914) (← links)
- Two-sided coalitional matchings (Q554501) (← links)
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples (Q708931) (← links)
- Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples'' (Q840696) (← links)
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples (Q864893) (← links)
- Finding all stable matchings with couples (Q908185) (← links)
- Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples (Q975759) (← links)
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts (Q1030169) (← links)
- Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand (Q1668513) (← links)
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts (Q1958950) (← links)
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues (Q2371150) (← links)
- Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets (Q2455677) (← links)
- Fair and efficient student placement with couples (Q2458423) (← links)
- Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) (Q2463787) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (Q2482681) (← links)
- Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities (Q2638313) (← links)
- MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY (Q2854007) (← links)
- Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities (Q2931695) (← links)