Pages that link to "Item:Q1820991"
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The following pages link to Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model (Q1820991):
Displayed 15 items.
- The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates (Q490458) (← links)
- Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules (Q513294) (← links)
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain (Q622583) (← links)
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control (Q627120) (← links)
- Recognizing one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles (Q845009) (← links)
- Geometric stable roommates (Q976079) (← links)
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree (Q1122456) (← links)
- Linear programming brings marital bliss (Q1122480) (← links)
- A maximum \(b\)-matching problem arising from median location models with applications to the roommates problem (Q1380926) (← links)
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings (Q1592723) (← links)
- Combinatorial voter control in elections (Q2346381) (← links)
- Subquadratic algorithms for succinct stable matching (Q2415371) (← links)
- The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates (Q2513672) (← links)
- Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby? (Q2634484) (← links)
- Exact algorithms for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems (Q5964076) (← links)