The following pages link to Making just school assignments (Q2516227):
Displaying 16 items.
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles (Q496872) (← links)
- New axioms for immediate acceptance (Q682464) (← links)
- Sticky matching in school choice (Q683828) (← links)
- Competitive equilibria in school assignment (Q1651277) (← links)
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities (Q1691346) (← links)
- Fair student placement (Q1706794) (← links)
- Trading probabilities along cycles (Q2138374) (← links)
- Essentially stable matchings (Q2178028) (← links)
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model (Q2205990) (← links)
- New axioms for deferred acceptance (Q2397664) (← links)
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments (Q2409677) (← links)
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)
- New axioms for top trading cycles (Q6066263) (← links)
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design (Q6536583) (← links)
- Top trading cycles (Q6559462) (← links)
- A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem (Q6575517) (← links)
