Pages that link to "Item:Q2931695"
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The following pages link to Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities (Q2931695):
Displaying 19 items.
- Assignment problems with complementarities (Q308621) (← links)
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801) (← links)
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints (Q508390) (← links)
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching (Q523005) (← links)
- Finding all stable matchings with couples (Q908185) (← links)
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186) (← links)
- Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand (Q1668513) (← links)
- Emergence and dynamics of short food supply chains (Q2031240) (← links)
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment (Q2138086) (← links)
- On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice (Q2157898) (← links)
- Multilateral matching (Q2253837) (← links)
- Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching (Q2280043) (← links)
- Fair cake-cutting among families (Q2296036) (← links)
- Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules (Q2416641) (← links)
- School choice with neighbors (Q2425195) (← links)
- Technical Note—Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets (Q5058044) (← links)
- Market Design (Q5150291) (← links)
- Stable Matching in Large Economies (Q5225243) (← links)
- Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences (Q6188684) (← links)
