Pages that link to "Item:Q4629238"
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The following pages link to THE EQUITABLE TOP TRADING CYCLES MECHANISM FOR SCHOOL CHOICE (Q4629238):
Displaying 11 items.
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2173093) (← links)
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility (Q2273939) (← links)
- On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action (Q2292744) (← links)
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case (Q2294296) (← links)
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf (Q6121908) (← links)
- School choice with transferable student characteristics (Q6148575) (← links)
- Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice (Q6168800) (← links)
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design (Q6536583) (← links)
- Top trading cycles (Q6559462) (← links)
- School choice with farsighted students (Q6665658) (← links)
- Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off? (Q6665669) (← links)
