Pages that link to "Item:Q869869"

The following pages link to Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations (Q869869):

Displaying 30 items.

• On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts (Q423778) (← links)
• First price package auction with many traders (Q516057) (← links)
• Statistical modeling of Vickrey auctions and applications to automated bidding strategies (Q523174) (← links)
• Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders (Q550207) (← links)
• Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences (Q682485) (← links)
• Auction design with costly preference elicitation (Q812389) (← links)
• An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem (Q835835) (← links)
• Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items (Q869596) (← links)
• Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions (Q972880) (← links)
• On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions (Q976430) (← links)
• Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions (Q1021601) (← links)
• An efficient ascending auction for private valuations (Q1622372) (← links)
• Sustainable decision model for liner shipping industry (Q1652471) (← links)
• Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions (Q1691348) (← links)
• Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study (Q1944865) (← links)
• Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction (Q2013362) (← links)
• Position auctions with multi-unit demands (Q2031180) (← links)
• Dynamic communication mechanism design (Q2058846) (← links)
• Connected price dynamics with revealed preferences and Auctioneer's discretion in VCG combinatorial auction (Q2098923) (← links)
• A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences (Q2173118) (← links)
• Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets (Q2231426) (← links)
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA (Q2268110) (← links)
• Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case (Q2276546) (← links)
• Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions (Q2436300) (← links)
• Combinatorial auctions (Q2480257) (← links)
• Combinatorial auctions for electronic business (Q2571439) (← links)
• Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions (Q2655643) (← links)
• Iterative Auction Design for Tree Valuations (Q3465578) (← links)
• Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms (Q5080659) (← links)
• A study of auction mechanisms for multilateral procurement based on subgradient and bundle methods (Q6160378) (← links)