Pages that link to "Item:Q1277472"
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The following pages link to On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules (Q1277472):
Displaying 14 items.
- Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules (Q656803) (← links)
- Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC? (Q816096) (← links)
- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes (Q898672) (← links)
- On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules (Q993505) (← links)
- The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser (Q1300394) (← links)
- The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes (Q1763193) (← links)
- On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data (Q1867823) (← links)
- The stability set as a social choice correspondence. (Q1867836) (← links)
- On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner (Q1972344) (← links)
- Complexity and the geometry of voting (Q2389766) (← links)
- Consequences of reversing preferences (Q2580249) (← links)
- On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives (Q2829684) (← links)
- On the Probability of the Ostrogorski Paradox (Q5053689) (← links)
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report (Q5053701) (← links)