Pages that link to "Item:Q2569386"
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The following pages link to An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf (Q2569386):
Displayed 5 items.
- The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences (Q637586) (← links)
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186) (← links)
- Consistency in one-sided assignment problems (Q1959691) (← links)
- Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market (Q2267527) (← links)
- Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core (Q6063093) (← links)