Pages that link to "Item:Q3521316"
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The following pages link to A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem (Q3521316):
Displayed 50 items.
- Risky utilities (Q324366) (← links)
- Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring (Q337806) (← links)
- Strategies in the principal-agent model (Q361824) (← links)
- A theory of political and economic cycles (Q406397) (← links)
- A mathematical treatment of bank monitoring incentives (Q471170) (← links)
- On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time (Q501748) (← links)
- A dynamic principal-agent problem as a feedback Stackelberg differential game (Q627774) (← links)
- Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model (Q629322) (← links)
- Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment (Q654513) (← links)
- Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats (Q682462) (← links)
- Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection (Q779104) (← links)
- Prevention efforts, insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures (Q784461) (← links)
- Dynamic contract design for systemic cyber risk management of interdependent enterprise networks (Q823843) (← links)
- Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach (Q900602) (← links)
- A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment (Q900606) (← links)
- A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model (Q900607) (← links)
- On the smoothness of value functions and the existence of optimal strategies in diffusion models (Q900609) (← links)
- Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks (Q1007324) (← links)
- Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation (Q1616079) (← links)
- Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment (Q1624474) (← links)
- Moral hazard under ambiguity (Q1626505) (← links)
- When \(q\) theory meets large losses risks and agency conflicts (Q1650711) (← links)
- Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems (Q1691442) (← links)
- Asset pricing under optimal contracts (Q1693186) (← links)
- Default and liquidation timing under asymmetric information (Q1695046) (← links)
- A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory (Q1711718) (← links)
- A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity (Q1727153) (← links)
- Optimal self-enforcement and termination (Q1734582) (← links)
- A tractable model of limited enforcement and the life-cycle dynamics of firms (Q1787294) (← links)
- Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns (Q1932540) (← links)
- A dynamic theory of war and peace (Q1958959) (← links)
- Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs (Q1994202) (← links)
- Optimal compensation and investment affected by firm size and time-varying external factors (Q2022926) (← links)
- The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model (Q2046544) (← links)
- New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting (Q2067400) (← links)
- Ambiguity in dynamic contracts (Q2067409) (← links)
- Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties (Q2088616) (← links)
- Agent's optimal compensation under inflation risk by using dynamic contract model (Q2121174) (← links)
- Incentives, lockdown, and testing: from Thucydides' analysis to the COVID-19 pandemic (Q2133932) (← links)
- Optimal long-term contracts with disability insurance under limited commitment (Q2138619) (← links)
- Robust contracting in general contract spaces (Q2143885) (← links)
- Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager (Q2143892) (← links)
- Constrained optimal stopping, liquidity and effort (Q2145802) (← links)
- Optimal CEO turnover (Q2155243) (← links)
- Governmental incentives for Green bonds investment (Q2155563) (← links)
- A continuous-time version of a delegated asset management problem (Q2217060) (← links)
- How to build stable relationships between people who lie and cheat (Q2254954) (← links)
- Dynamic contracts with random monitoring (Q2283129) (← links)
- Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion (Q2291788) (← links)
- Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection (Q2302840) (← links)