Prevention efforts, insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures (Q784461)
From MaRDI portal
!
This is the item page for this Wikibase entity, intended for internal use and editing purposes. Please use the normal view instead:
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7226850
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| default for all languages | No label defined |
||
| English | Prevention efforts, insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7226850 |
Statements
Prevention efforts, insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures (English)
0 references
3 August 2020
0 references
The authors frame the problems of self-insurance and self-protection in the context of a Stackelberg game between the two counterparties, in accordance with the ``principal-agent problem''. Furthermore, the criterion of both the agent and the principal is expressed by means of a law invariant coherent risk measure. The study shows that the considered game always admits an equilibrium. The theoretical results are applied to some cases of insurance claim distributions widely used in practice. An Appendix contains details and insights about some technical aspects of the paper.
0 references
prevention
0 references
self-insurance
0 references
self-protection
0 references
coherent risk measures
0 references
Stackelberg game
0 references
0 references
0 references
0 references
0.8453452587127686
0 references
0.8257991075515747
0 references
0.7523101568222046
0 references
0.748358964920044
0 references
0.7476186752319336
0 references
