The following pages link to (Q3524718):
Displayed 50 items.
- Groves mechanisms and communication externalities (Q283181) (← links)
- Nonpreemptive coordination mechanisms for identical machines (Q372964) (← links)
- Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks (Q391236) (← links)
- Efficient money burning in general domains (Q506525) (← links)
- Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization (Q518710) (← links)
- Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions (Q543608) (← links)
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness (Q550194) (← links)
- The Pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design (Q777959) (← links)
- Decentralized subcontractor scheduling with divisible jobs (Q892907) (← links)
- Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view (Q899165) (← links)
- Balanced allocation mechanism: an optimal mechanism for multiple keywords sponsored search auctions (Q903629) (← links)
- Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning (Q959896) (← links)
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results (Q1001137) (← links)
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results (Q1001138) (← links)
- A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions (Q1735729) (← links)
- Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs (Q1744245) (← links)
- Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain (Q1753138) (← links)
- Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets (Q1753496) (← links)
- Algorithms for strategyproof classification (Q1761283) (← links)
- On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections (Q1761290) (← links)
- Incentive compatible regression learning (Q1959425) (← links)
- Binary public decisions and undominated mechanisms (Q2067359) (← links)
- Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies (Q2068880) (← links)
- Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders (Q2210509) (← links)
- Aided design of market mechanisms for electricity clusters (Q2228260) (← links)
- Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets (Q2238720) (← links)
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts (Q2253831) (← links)
- Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies (Q2345938) (← links)
- An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism (Q2346377) (← links)
- Efficiency and complexity of price competition among single-product vendors (Q2407455) (← links)
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains (Q2447058) (← links)
- Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms (Q2447059) (← links)
- Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms (Q2454572) (← links)
- On influence, stable behavior, and the most influential individuals in networks: a game-theoretic approach (Q2510117) (← links)
- Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint (Q2513284) (← links)
- Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions (Q2516249) (← links)
- Social choice theory in HOL. Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite (Q2655324) (← links)
- SBBA: A Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism (Q2819464) (← links)
- Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments (Q2937768) (← links)
- Optimal Mechanism Design for a Sequencing Problem with Two-Dimensional Types (Q2957467) (← links)
- Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions (Q3133819) (← links)
- Efficient Money Burning in General Domains (Q3449584) (← links)
- Optimal contract design for effort-averse sensors (Q4960207) (← links)
- Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule (Q5501960) (← links)
- (Q5743441) (← links)
- Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses (Q5870368) (← links)
- A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling (Q5918088) (← links)
- An incentive compatible, efficient market for air traffic flow management (Q5918109) (← links)
- Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets (Q6067051) (← links)
- Combinatorial reallocation mechanisms (Q6130328) (← links)