Pages that link to "Item:Q3748017"
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The following pages link to Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (Q3748017):
Displaying 50 items.
- Pricing and balancing of the sea-cargo service chain with empty equipment repositioning (Q337385) (← links)
- Robust contracting with additive noise (Q337835) (← links)
- Strategies in the principal-agent model (Q361824) (← links)
- On coordination of supply chain based on information asymmetry of effort level and fuzzy market environment (Q382471) (← links)
- Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism (Q431213) (← links)
- Two-stage pricing for custom-made products (Q439697) (← links)
- A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents (Q453463) (← links)
- Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation (Q459159) (← links)
- Multi-task agency with unawareness (Q490055) (← links)
- Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships (Q496871) (← links)
- Multiple tasks and political organization (Q498861) (← links)
- Multivariate prevention decisions: safe today or sorry tomorrow? (Q498864) (← links)
- On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time (Q501748) (← links)
- Coarse matching with incomplete information (Q535167) (← links)
- Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard (Q548258) (← links)
- Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model (Q602975) (← links)
- Channel incentives in sharing new product demand information and robust contracts (Q613452) (← links)
- A dynamic principal-agent problem as a feedback Stackelberg differential game (Q627774) (← links)
- Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship (Q633781) (← links)
- Correlation and relative performance evaluation (Q665451) (← links)
- On optimal sharing rules in discrete- and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility (Q673263) (← links)
- Monitoring, diversification and managerial incentive contracts (Q674232) (← links)
- Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats (Q682462) (← links)
- Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement (Q694727) (← links)
- Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all? (Q776858) (← links)
- Correlation neglect, incentives, and welfare (Q777701) (← links)
- Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection (Q779104) (← links)
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design (Q900598) (← links)
- Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach (Q900602) (← links)
- A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model (Q900607) (← links)
- Financial innovation and risk: the role of information (Q902183) (← links)
- Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships (Q913628) (← links)
- Optimal contracts in continuous-time models (Q937467) (← links)
- Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent (Q943879) (← links)
- Optimal design of the guarantee for defined contribution funds (Q953713) (← links)
- An equilibrium model of child maltreatment (Q956540) (← links)
- An incentive contract for leadtime reduction in an \((S-1,S)\) inventory system (Q959508) (← links)
- The employment contract when the firm can utilize a free resource (Q969641) (← links)
- Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion (Q980958) (← links)
- On the design of piece-rate contracts (Q985204) (← links)
- Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks (Q1007324) (← links)
- Strategic wholesale pricing in a supply chain with a potential entrant (Q1039788) (← links)
- Value of communication in agencies (Q1119137) (← links)
- Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms (Q1190243) (← links)
- The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility (Q1270062) (← links)
- Regulation of a risk averse firm (Q1272618) (← links)
- Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard (Q1276114) (← links)
- The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields (Q1309986) (← links)
- Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts (Q1311269) (← links)
- Managerial incentive contracts with a production externality (Q1311271) (← links)
