Pages that link to "Item:Q3748017"

The following pages link to Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (Q3748017):

Displaying 47 items.

• Pricing and balancing of the sea-cargo service chain with empty equipment repositioning (Q337385) (← links)
• Robust contracting with additive noise (Q337835) (← links)
• Strategies in the principal-agent model (Q361824) (← links)
• On coordination of supply chain based on information asymmetry of effort level and fuzzy market environment (Q382471) (← links)
• Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism (Q431213) (← links)
• Two-stage pricing for custom-made products (Q439697) (← links)
• A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents (Q453463) (← links)
• Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation (Q459159) (← links)
• Multi-task agency with unawareness (Q490055) (← links)
• Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships (Q496871) (← links)
• Multiple tasks and political organization (Q498861) (← links)
• Multivariate prevention decisions: safe today or sorry tomorrow? (Q498864) (← links)
• On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time (Q501748) (← links)
• Coarse matching with incomplete information (Q535167) (← links)
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard (Q548258) (← links)
• Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model (Q602975) (← links)
• Channel incentives in sharing new product demand information and robust contracts (Q613452) (← links)
• A dynamic principal-agent problem as a feedback Stackelberg differential game (Q627774) (← links)
• Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship (Q633781) (← links)
• Correlation and relative performance evaluation (Q665451) (← links)
• On optimal sharing rules in discrete- and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility (Q673263) (← links)
• Monitoring, diversification and managerial incentive contracts (Q674232) (← links)
• Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats (Q682462) (← links)
• Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement (Q694727) (← links)
• Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all? (Q776858) (← links)
• Correlation neglect, incentives, and welfare (Q777701) (← links)
• Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection (Q779104) (← links)
• Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks (Q1007324) (← links)
• Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal (Q4634215) (← links)
• Profit Sharing Agreements in Decentralized Supply Chains: A Distributionally Robust Approach (Q4969339) (← links)
• Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard (Q5144775) (← links)
• A Tale of a Principal and Many, Many Agents (Q5219725) (← links)
• Optimal Electricity Demand Response Contracting with Responsiveness Incentives (Q5868950) (← links)
• Pollution Regulation for Electricity Generators in a Transmission Network (Q6042791) (← links)
• Public private partnerships contract under moral hazard and ambiguous information (Q6051214) (← links)
• Optimal make–take fees for market making regulation (Q6078433) (← links)
• Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks (Q6098176) (← links)
• Entropic Optimal Planning for Path-Dependent Mean Field Games (Q6098456) (← links)
• Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments (Q6100484) (← links)
• An analytically solvable principal-agent model (Q6102563) (← links)
• Targeting in networks under costly agreements (Q6102573) (← links)
• Optimal stopping contract for public private partnerships under moral hazard (Q6105371) (← links)
• Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies (Q6166333) (← links)
• Optimal Brokerage Contracts in Almgren–Chriss Model with Multiple Clients (Q6169626) (← links)
• Optimal contracts to a principal-agent model with a diffusion coefficient affected by firm size (Q6175374) (← links)
• Robust contracting under double moral hazard (Q6180418) (← links)
• Robust Incentives for Teams (Q6181691) (← links)