The following pages link to Implementation with evidence (Q4683689):
Displayed 34 items.
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information (Q308649) (← links)
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors (Q325030) (← links)
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms (Q325031) (← links)
- Implementation with partial provability (Q449172) (← links)
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules (Q523473) (← links)
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals (Q665086) (← links)
- Bargaining through approval (Q745006) (← links)
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs (Q785539) (← links)
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide (Q1650274) (← links)
- Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents (Q1668496) (← links)
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies (Q1684127) (← links)
- Implementation via rights structures (Q1757583) (← links)
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents (Q1787988) (← links)
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals (Q1792573) (← links)
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals (Q1800965) (← links)
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information (Q2002347) (← links)
- Reaching consensus through approval bargaining (Q2013345) (← links)
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions (Q2100648) (← links)
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (Q2206010) (← links)
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions (Q2235090) (← links)
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability (Q2296029) (← links)
- Evidence reading mechanisms (Q2325665) (← links)
- Double implementation without no-veto-power (Q2334843) (← links)
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals (Q2343379) (← links)
- Experimental design to persuade (Q2343397) (← links)
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners (Q2347780) (← links)
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty (Q2437181) (← links)
- Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes (Q2439798) (← links)
- Process manipulation in unique implementation (Q2453402) (← links)
- Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion (Q2627913) (← links)
- Implementation with a sympathizer (Q2682027) (← links)
- Persuasion and dynamic communication (Q4585998) (← links)
- Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information (Q5111111) (← links)
- Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification (Q6084797) (← links)