A Menu of Insurance Contracts for the Unemployed

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAB026MaRDI QIDQ5064515zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Regis Barnichon, Yanos Zylberberg

Publication date 16 March 2022

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab026

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionmoral hazardunemployment insurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

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Cited in

(3)

• Optimal entry decision of unemployment insurance under partial information
• Optimal unemployment insurance and employment history
• An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance

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