A Tamper-Evident Voting Machine Resistant to Covert Channels

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-88733-1_24MaRDI QIDQ5505481zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wei Han, Tao Hao, Dong Zheng, Xiaofeng Chen, Kefei Chen

Publication date 27 January 2009

Published in Provable Security (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88733-1_24

zbMATH Keywords

covert channelelectronic votingreceipt-freetamper-evident

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Recommendations

• Receipt-free electronic voting scheme with a tamper-resistant randomizer
• Coercion-resistant electronic elections
• Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)
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Cites work

• A generalisation, a simplification and some applications of Paillier's probabilistic public-key system
• A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
• A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party. (Extended abstract)
• Auditable Privacy: On Tamper-Evident Mix Networks
• Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes
• Receipt-Free Universally-Verifiable Voting with Everlasting Privacy
• Secret sharing decryption in the context of voting or lotteries

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