Coercion-resistant electronic elections

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_2MaRDI QIDQ3569101zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ari Juels, Dario Catalano, Markus Jakobsson

Publication date 17 June 2010

Published in Towards Trustworthy Elections (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_2

zbMATH Keywords

coercion-resistanceelectronic votingmix networksreceipt-freeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Cryptography (94A60)

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Cited in

(27)

• Review of cryptographic schemes applied to remote electronic voting systems: remaining challenges and the upcoming post-quantum paradigm
• Exploiting re-voting in the Helios election system
• Secret, verifiable auctions from elections
• Designated-verifier linkable ring signatures
• How (not) to achieve both coercion resistance and cast as intended verifiability in remote evoting
• Surveying global verifiability
• An efficient multi-receipt mechanism for uncoercible anonymous electronic voting
• Polynomial runtime and composability
• Cast-as-intended: a formal definition and case studies
• Short paper: ballot secrecy for liquid democracy
• Surveying definitions of election verifiability
• Beyond Subterm-Convergent Equational Theories in Automated Verification of Stateful Protocols
• Incoercible multi-party computation and universally composable receipt-free voting
• Anonymity in voting revisited
• A Linked-List Approach to Cryptographically Secure Elections Using Instant Runoff Voting
• Coercion resistant end-to-end voting
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1024093 (Why is no real title available?)
• A formal framework for modelling coercion resistance and receipt freeness
• Verifiable elections that scale for free
• A Tamper-Evident Voting Machine Resistant to Covert Channels
• Ceremonies for End-to-End Verifiable Elections
• How to challenge and cast your e-vote
• A coercion-resistant blockchain-based E-voting protocol with receipts
• One vote is enough for analysing privacy
• Fully tally-hiding verifiable E-voting for real-world elections with seat-allocations
• Efficient VSS free of computational assumption
• Protecting the privacy of voters: new definitions of ballot secrecy for e-voting

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