A classically-based theory of impossible worlds
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In the author's metaphysics a situation is an abstract object which encodes a set of propositions, where a proposition is a \(0\)-ary property. A possible world encodes a maximal consistent set of propositions and an impossible world encodes a maximal set of propositions which is not consistent.
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Cites work
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Cited in
(11)- Impossible worlds: A modest approach
- The ontology of impossible worlds
- Two semantical approaches to paraconsistent modalities
- Metaphysical modality, without possible worlds
- Essence and modal knowledge
- Modal Meinongianism: conceiving the impossible
- Against classical paraconsistent metatheory
- Modality across different logics
- Typed object theory
- Mission impossible
- Experiential attitudes are propositional
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