Absolute equilibrium in differential games
Let \(G\) be an \(n\)-person open-loop differential game. At an absolute equilibrium for such a game, deviation by any player or coalition of players is not advantageous. As is well known, there is no general existence theorem for absolute equilibrium. This paper introduces a weakening of absolute equilibrium, called complete equilibrium. Complete equilibrium, when it exists, is characterized by a set of maximin inequalities, one for each possible \((2^n-1)\) coalition. A further result requires checking a smaller number of inequalities \((n-1)\), but does not characterize all complete equilibria.
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