Adversarial Scheduling Analysis of Game-Theoretic Models of Norm Diffusion

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-69407-6_31MaRDI QIDQ3507442zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors S. S. Ravi, Gabriel Istrate, Madhav V. Marathe

Publication date 19 June 2008

Published in Logic and Theory of Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/0803.2495

zbMATH Keywords

adversarial schedulingevolutionary gamesMarkov chains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Abstract: In (Istrate, Marathe, Ravi SODA 2001) we advocated the investigation of robustness of results in the theory of learning in games under adversarial scheduling models. We provide evidence that such an analysis is feasible and can lead to nontrivial results by investigating, in an adversarial scheduling setting, Peyton Young's model of diffusion of norms. In particular, our main result incorporates into Peyton Young's model.

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(2)

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• Stochastic Stability in Schelling’s Segregation Model with Markovian Asynchronous Update

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