Agent-constrained truthful facility location games

DOI10.1007/S10878-025-01258-7MaRDI QIDQ7020741zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Argyrios Deligkas, Mohammad Hassan Lotfi, Alexandros A. Voudouris

Publication date 3 March 2025

Published in Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S10878-025-01258-7

zbMATH Keywords

approximation ratiofacility locationmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Applications of game theory (91A80) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites work

• Constrained heterogeneous facility location games with max-variant cost
• Facility location games with optional preference
• Facility location games with ordinal preferences
• Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources
• Heterogeneous facility location without money
• Mechanism design for facility location games with candidate locations
• On Discrete Truthful Heterogeneous Two-Facility Location
• On truthful constrained heterogeneous facility location with max-variant cost
• Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
• The distortion of distributed facility location
• Two-facility location games with minimum distance requirement
• Two-facility-location games with mixed types of agents

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