An algorithm for computing all Berge equilibria

DOI10.1155/2015/862842MaRDI QIDQ275883zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors H. W. Corley, Phantipa Kwain

Publication date 26 April 2016

Published in Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/862842

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Review text

Summary: An algorithm is presented in this note for determining all Berge equilibria for an \(n\)-person game in normal form. This algorithm is based on the notion of disappointment, with the payoff matrix (PM) being transformed into a disappointment matrix (DM). The DM has the property that a pure strategy profile of the PM is a BE if and only if \((0,\dots,0)\) is the corresponding entry of the DM. Furthermore, any \((0,\dots,0)\) entry of the DM is also a more restrictive Berge-Vaisman equilibrium if and only if each player's BE payoff is at least as large as the player's maximin security level.

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A NEW THEOREM TO FIND BERGE EQUILIBRIA
• A note on Berge equilibrium
• Berge-Vaisman and Nash equilibria: transformation of games
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
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Cited in

(10)

• Berge equilibrium in linear-quadratic mean-field-type games
• A mixed cooperative dual to the Nash equilibrium
• Corrigendum to: ``An algorithm for computing all Berge equilibria
• The computational complexity of finding a mixed Berge equilibrium for a k-person noncooperative game in normal form
• A Nonlinear Programming Approach to Determine a Generalized Equilibrium for N-Person Normal Form Games
• Berge equilibrium in normal form static games: a literature review
• A Note on Berge Equilibria in n-Person 2-Strategy Games
• On self- and other-regarding cooperation: Kant versus Berge
• Matrix representations of Berge stabilities in the graph model for conflict resolution
• Existence theorems of generalized K-lateral support equilibria via local cooperative strategies for multi-player pure strategy games in tensor form

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