An individual evolutionary learning model meets Cournot

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2024.104992MaRDI QIDQ6972991zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jasmina Arifovic, Liang Diao, Nobuyuki Hanaki

Publication date 11 June 2025

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JEDC.2024.104992

zbMATH Keywords

experimentindividual evolutionary learningoligopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Social learning (91D15)

Cites work

• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences
• An illustration of the essential difference between individual and social learning, and its consequences for computational analyses.
• Bertrand colludes more than Cournot
• Experimental Cournot oligopoly and inequity aversion
• From imitation to collusion: long-run learning in a low-information environment
• Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model
• Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
• Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
• Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust
• Information and learning in oligopoly: an experiment
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Through trial and error to collusion
• Zero-knowledge cooperation in dilemma games

This page was built for publication: An individual evolutionary learning model meets Cournot

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6972991)