Approval compatible voting rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-025-01588-9MaRDI QIDQ6844245zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Zoi Terzopoulou, Jérôme Lang, William S. Zwicker

Publication date 16 March 2026

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-025-01588-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Cites work

• A comparison of Dodgson's method and Kemeny's rule
• Approval voting and positional voting methods: inference, relationship, examples
• Borda and condorcet: Some distance results
• Borda efficiency of constant scoring rules with large electorates
• Choosing subsets: a size-independent probabilistic model and the quest for a social welfare ordering
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 750169 (Why is no real title available?)
• Introduction to computational social choice
• Size approval voting
• Systematic analysis of multiple voting rules

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